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Abstract
Property rights are assured by the collective standing behind one's claim to the benefits
stream generated by property.  Changing technology and institutions have interacted
throughout history to create property rights from what had previously been public goods.
The discovery of knowledge about DNA and the useful products that can be created
through applications of that knowledge has generated conditions that have led to
intellectual private property claims on many new processes and products.  Large
multinational life sciences companies seeking to capitalize on these developments have
purchased many heretofore independent seed companies, leading to a high level of
concentration in the seed industry.  These issues are treated differently is various
countries and many developing countries have limited capacity to deal with them.
Policies to address the challenges created by this set of events are outlined.
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“Though all the fruits [the earth] naturally produces, and beasts it feeds,
belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of
Nature, and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of
mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state, yet being given
for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some
way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular
men.”  
John Locke, Concerning the True, Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government.
Property can be defined as assets that generate a benefit stream.  Property rights in turn,
can be defined as “the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a
benefit stream.”3  We generally think of property as land, buildings and financial
instruments, but since the eighteenth century, technology has probably created property
of far greater value than all existing real estate.  Compare, for example, a technology-
based corporation like Microsoft with a physical asset-based one like General Motors.  In
late December, 1998, Microsoft corporation was valued by the stock market at $353 bill
while General Motors was valued at $48 bill.  Microsoft had annual sales of $16 bill
while GM had annual sales of  $150 bill.4  The huge asset represented by Microsoft was
generated simply through technology as embodied in software (and market power), while
land, building and machinery are an insignificant part of the total.
A second example provides further illustration.  Prior to the development of the telegraph
in 1837, the electromagnetic spectrum existed but had no economic value.  Visible light
from the sun was the primary member of the electromagnetic spectrum that provided
services recognized by humanity.  Sunlight stands as one of the few remaining examples
of a public goods – its use by one person does not compete with or rival its use by
another, and no person can exclude other persons from its use (although blockage of
natural light in cities is changing this, and physical constraints like imprisonment can
deny individuals access to sunlight).  In economics jargon, sunlight is a pure public good
because its consumption is non-rival and non-excludable.
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3Technological developments have transformed other members of the electromagnetic
spectrum from unrecognized public goods to private assets of immense value.  Radio
waves were unknown in the eighteenth century.  They certainly were not private
property.  Since then the world has seen their conversion from unknown phenomena, into
public goods and then into private goods through the application of science to create
technologies and then the creation of laws and other social institutions by which to
appropriate that property and allocate the income streams generated therefrom.  Further,
the nature of electromagnetic waves – their ability to travel infinite distances through
space, and the applications invented for their use – long distance communications --
means that to be effective, the laws or agreements about their use must cover large
distances.  Electromagnetic waves quickly became the subject of international
agreements.
As the telegraph spread, it became apparent that without some standards and regulations
its use would be limited.  In 1865 the International Telegraph Union was created with the
adoption of the first Convention by twenty countries.5  The invention of the telephone in
1876 was followed by agreements on its use in 1885; the first voice radio transmission in
1902 was followed in1906 by the Berlin International Radiotelegraph Conference; the
first broadcast radio in 1920 by international agreements on its use in 1927; and so forth
through television, the launching of Sputnik, communications satellites, cable TV, and
cellular telephone.6  The Iridium system, which claims the ability to provide instant voice
and data communications from any spot on the globe however remote, to any other, is the
latest step in this series of technological developments. With each innovation, regulations
allocated the relevant electromagnetic waves.  In the beginning, allocations had little
value, but as the value of communications for advertising became apparent, broadcast
licenses became important assets.  The transformation of the ether from a valueless,
ephemeral, universal presence into private property, through interrelated innovations in
technology and institutions, is complete.
As might be expected, the creation of this wealth has generated conflict, with different
individuals and groups each seeking to maximize their own benefits.  The nature of the
conflict is not always obvious.  In 1963, the Hat Creek radio telescope of the University
of California detected  unexpectedly strong transmissions from deep space that were
discovered to be the “first known natural maser, an intense blast of laserlike, organized
radio waves unleashed by molecules excited by cosmic radiation.”7  This unusually
strong signal, localized at 1612 megahertz (MHz), has led to an important scientific tool
that enables astronomers to estimate the diameter of stars and their distance from earth.
But while this particular signal is quite distinct and localized, other signals close to 1612
MHz can interfere with the scientific applications.  For the past forty years astronomers
have sought to protect the area around 1612 MHz from radio signals.  In 1992, the
International Telecommunications Union awarded radio astronomers primary rights to
the spectrum from 1610 to 1613.5 MHz to protect them from harmful interference.
However, the Iridium system has rights to an adjacent band, from 1616 to 1626.5, and
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4stray radiation from Iridium is claimed to degrade the quality of the astronomers’
signals.8  Technological and regulatory solutions to the conflict are being explored.
Similarly to the electromagnetic spectrum, which has existed from the beginning of time,
DNA has existed from the beginning of life as we know it, providing the essential service
of transmitting all biological traits from one generation to the next.  It was generating
great value, but was not an asset.  It was like sunlight, a part of nature whose use was
non-rival and non-excludable.  The discovery of DNA and the invention of ways to
visualize it, characterize it, map it and move it from one organism to another has
generated a new class of asset whose ownership is now being contested by multi-billion
dollar companies.  What was a global genetic commons is being enclosed.  The pace is
rapid, and at the end of the Twentieth Century intellectual property rights over plant
genomic information is being concentrated in the hands of a few highly capitalized
companies.  “Monsanto along with a handful of other major corporations now holds most
of the primary biotechnology-related assets needed for doing business in the agricultural
sector.”9  The potential implication of these developments for the public interest is the
focus of  this paper.
Property Rights in Crop Plants
Varieties of vegetatively propagated plants have been patentable in the United States
since 1930, and sexually propagated plants (i.e. those reproduced through ordinary
seeds), have been eligible for intellectual property protection under the Plant Variety
Protection Act since 1970.  But there was little public attention to the issue of intellectual
property in plants.  The seed industry consisted of hundreds of small companies
producing seeds for relatively local conditions.  Plant breeders in universities and
government agencies continued to be the main creators of new varieties, which were
provided to seed companies at little or no cost.  The technical nature of seed was
unchanged, despite the legal ability to claim patent protection.
Open-pollinated seeds (i.e., seeds other than hybrids), reproduce the traits of their parents
with high fidelity, so once a farmer has even a small quantity of seed of a particular
variety, she can obtain additional seed simply by growing the crop and harvesting the
grain, which is seed for the next planting.  The seeds of desirable crop varieties have
historically spread quickly from farmer to farmer.  In the low-income countries of Asia
this is how the “Green Revolution,” spread, and not withstanding many reports to the
contrary, spread quickly and widely to farmers of all sizes and characteristics.10  Not only
do seeds self-reproduce, but it is difficult or impossible to distinguish varieties by looking
at their seeds (sometimes even by looking at the growing plant because appearance is
inevitably affected by growing conditions).  Thus, farmers could easily reproduce seeds
of new varieties and companies would have no way of proving the seed was their variety.
The incentive for private companies to invest in developing new plant varieties was
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5limited because open-pollinated seeds are like a public good -- once they exist it is
difficult to prevent any farmer from using them (non-excludable), and because they self-
reproduce, their use by one farmer does not compete with their use by another (non-
rival).
Hybrids provide the contrasting example and were the primary driver of private
investment in the seed business before the 1990s.  Hybrids are produced by crossing two
distinctly different parental lines.  Planting the seed harvested from a hybrid crop
typically gives a range of different-looking, different-quality, different-maturity
offspring.  Farmers who want to grow the original hybrid have to obtain new seed for
each planting.  Companies that were able to keep the identity of the parental lines secret
were able to prevent others from producing their hybrids, thereby generating continuing
sales potential.  By creating hybrids with improved production traits that were attractive
to farmers, companies built businesses based on hybrid seeds beginning in the 1940s.
Hybrid seeds are not public goods because it is possible for companies to exclude farmers
from producing their seed.  But of all the major crops, only corn was well-suited to
hybrid seed production.
The development of DNA-based techniques, generally known as biotechnology, and their
application to plants opened new possibilities for seed businesses.  These techniques
permit one to routinely distinguish any individual living organism from any other,
regardless of  how similar they may look.  This makes it possible to identify the ancestors
of any plant variety and hence the developers of a variety with near certainty, just as in
the animal world a sample of DNA can be matched to any individual with near certainty.
That certainty provides a way to exercise property rights over seed varieties because now
one can prove who created the original variety.  DNA techniques also promise to make
possible the development of a wide range of new plant traits that will increase the
economic value of plants.
On the institutional side, the 1980 Diamond vs. Chakrabarty Supreme Court decision
permitted patenting of biological organisms, traits and genes set off an explosion of gene-
related investment, with a significant amount focused on plant genes.11 Still, as recently
as 1989, it was unclear “whether widespread patenting of agriculturally important genes
is a likely prospect,” partly because broader property claims based on a variety or trait
rather than genes were also possible.12
Most new non-hybrid varieties were produced by plant breeders working for land grant
universities in the United States or public institutions in other countries.  But that is
changing.  It is estimated that in 1994, private companies accounted for 66% of the
approximately 2241 scientist years devoted to plant breeding in the United States, up
from 63% in 1990.13   Carl Pray reports that now in the United States “more food and
agricultural research is conducted in the private sector than in the public sector…public
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6sector research is expenditure is increasing more rapidly than public expenditure…and
“private research is particularly strong in some of the fastest growing and most important
areas of applied agricultural research such as biotechnology, plant and animal breeding,
precision agriculture, and animal health.”14
The full consequences of the DNA revolution are still to be played out, but a number of
trends of interest have emerged:
1. Intellectual property rights are being rapidly extended to plants and their smallest
genomic components in the industrialized countries.
2. Intellectual property rights in plants are being pressed on developing countries
through international agreements.
3. A few companies have acquired most of the world’s seed production capacity.
4. Agribusiness, pharmaceutical and chemicals companies are merging to create a new,
highly concentrated, life sciences industry.
5. These new companies are providing unprecedented levels of funding to public
research universities.
Extension of Intellectual Property Rights. Until recently, intellectual property rights
(IPRs) were of limited relevance to plant breeding.  In both industrialized and developing
countries public-sector plant breeding programs were the chief producers of improved
crop varieties which were created by freely sharing genetic resources and research
findings across regions and countries. Public sector plant breeders took discoveries from
the academic world, combine them with local knowledge and genetic resources and
distribute the resulting varieties through local seed production systems.  The success of
such collaborative research depends on a willingness to share discoveries and materials
for the common good.  In the genetic improvement of plants, each enhancement (whether
through breeding or genetic engineering) is built on preceding generations so the process
of adding value requires physical use of the earlier plant material itself.
Taking advantage of the technical capability made possible by DNA, companies have
applied for and been granted patent rights  to plants and animals as well as biotechnology
research methods and cloned genes. Intellectual property rights extend not only to plant
traits and genes but also to the smallest fragments of genetic material.  In the United
States DNA constructs that meet “all the conditions for patentability (such as statutory
subject matter utility, enablement, written description, novelty, and non-obviousness)”
can be patented, although “in order for DNA sequences to be distinguished from their
naturally occurring counterparts, which cannot be patented, the patent application must
state that the invention has been purified or isolated or is part of a recombinant molecule
or is now part of a vector.”15    In particular, short fragments of DNA used as genome
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7markers like expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs), although they may not directly identify genes, “may still be extremely useful and
thus satisfy the utility requirement,” and hence be patentable.
The extension of patents to such short sequences of DNA raises some scientific and
intellectual issues which are illustrated by Gelbart’s analogy between an instruction book
and the genome.  He points out that if every set of information needed to deploy a given
protein or polypeptide in the correct set of cells at the proper developmental times and in
the requisite quantities were “analogous to one sentence in the instruction manual that we
call the genome, a reasonable current assessment is that we have partial but still quite
incomplete knowledge of how to identify and read certain nouns (the structures of the
nascent polypeptides and protein-coding exons of mRNAs).  Our ability to identify the
verbs and adjectives and other components of these genomic sentences is vanishing low.
Further, we do not understand the grammar at all – how to read a sentence, how to weave
the different sentences together to form sensible paragraphs describing how to build
multi-component proteins and other complexes.”16
In such an instruction book, is it appropriate that all elements – nouns, verbs, adjectives,
grammar, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, sections, and the whole  – be subjected to
intellectual property rights?  Is there not a distinction between the basic elements of DNA
and their combination something like the distinction between ideas and the expression of
ideas in copyright of conventional books, or like the distinction between words and
particular sequences of words?
Might it be preferable for much DNA information to be placed in the public domain by
its inventor and remain there?  It is certainly possible, for if a sequence or “invention has
been described in a patent or printed publication anywhere in the world, or if it has been
in public use or on sale in the United States for more than 1 year before the date on which
an application for patent is filed in the United States, a patent cannot be obtained.  Thus
any SNPs or ESTs that have been available in a public database for more than one year
prior to the filing date of the application cannot be patented.”17 Placi g basic DNA
information and materials in the public domain would allow property rights enforcement
to focus on traits of utility to farmers, which is after all where value is generated in
agriculture.
Extending Intellectual Property Rights to Developing Countries.  The principles of
sharing germplasm and research results among participants were at the center of the plant
breeding work of the centers supported by the CGIAR and were enshrined in an
International Undertaking of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations.18  But this tradition of sharing conflicts with several other international
agreements.  The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) which emerged from the
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development established nationa  overeign
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8rights over indigenous germplasm.  While it was motivated by a desire to protect
germplasm that might have pharmaceutical value, it applies to crop germplasm as well.19
A third international agreement, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, which forms part of the World Trade Organization apparatus, is requiring many
developing countries to establish intellectual property rights for plants if they wish to
participate on an equal basis in international trade in any products.
Although some believe that patents and other IPR may raise costs or discourage
innovations in the developing world, or shift power unfairly to industrialized country
firms away from developing country organizations, it appears that the momentum behind
the international agreements will make the introduction of intellectual property rights in
developing countries inevitable.  These initiatives, driven by industrial intellectual
property concerns have engulfed agricultural interests with a speed and intensity that has
caught many in the developing world unaware and unable to deal with intellectual
property rights.
Consolidation of the Seed Industry.  The consolidation of seed producers into a few
mega-seed companies has proceeded at an astounding rate over the past 15 years.  In
1982 Monsanto, now the second largest seed seller in the world, was a pure chemical
company until about 1982 when it entered the seed business by acquiring DeKalb's wheat
research program.  In the ‘90s they increased their seed business by obtaining AgriCetus,
Britian’s Plant Breeding Institute, Cargill’s seed operations in Africa, Asia, Central and
Latin America and Europe, and others.  They purchased Calgene Inc, a leader in plant
biotechnology in1995 and Asgrow Agronomics, a leader in soybean and corn seeds,
in1996.  In May, 1998 Monsanto announced that it had reached agreements to acquire
two seed companies – DeKalb Genetics Corporation and Delta & Pine Land Company,20
and in mid-year announced a merger with American Home Products.   The merger,
however, was abandoned, and in November Monsanto announced plans to cut its
workforce by 2500, possibly to help cover the $4.2 bill cost of DeKalb and Delta Pine.21
DuPont, another traditional chemical company, in 1997 established a $400 million joint
venture with Pioneer Hi-Bred, the world’s largest seed company.  The venture aimed at
producing feedgrains designed to optimize weight gains in livestock, and other products
tailored to meet specific markets.  Subsequently, DuPont acquired controlling ownership
of Pioneer.  Novartis, the third largest seed company, was created through a combination
of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz.  It owns Northrup King, Funk Seeds, Rogers Seed Company,
and six other seed companies and has sales of almost $1 bill annually.
Thus, Monsanto, along with a handful of other giant corporations – Pioneer/DuPont,
Novartis, AgrEvo, Zeneca, and Dow – are coming to dominate the world seed industry.
The ten largest firms have 30% of global seed sales and have attracted the attention and
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9opposition of groups that claim to represent farmers.22 The bu iness plans of the mega-
seed companies seem straightforward: control everything from genetic engineering of
seeds to the selling of seeds to farmers, to marketing plant-grown drugs, modified foods,
and industrial products.  They aggressively employ patents to claim intellectual property
and defend those claims equally aggressively, as illustrated by the case among Monsanto,
Novartis and Mycogen over rights to corn with “built-in insect resistance.23”  They re
developing new technologies to protect intellectual property technically, such as a gene
that makes the seed produced by their varieties sterile.  Within the next few years many,
if not most, of the potentially valuable genes from major crops are likely to be the
intellectual property of these corporations.  They can be expe ted to seek profits from
new high-quality seeds for farmers who are capable of paying a premium price.  But they
have little incentive for producing crops that are important to the poor and disadvantaged
farmers who primarily save their own seeds.
The Life Sciences Industry.  DNA contains all the information that distinguishes a living
organism and many believe it holds the key to creating all kinds of biologically active
materials that can cure or prevent diseases in humans, animals and plants.  This makes
DNA technology of great interest to pharmaceutical companies which have reached out
to acquire biotechnology capacity even as they were acquiring seed companies.  At the
same time, because many chemicals are used to affect biological processes such as pest
control in agriculture, chemical companies are interested in them.  The possibility of
modifying the biochemical properties of grains and oilseeds used as inputs in processed
foods has attracted the attention of food companies, who envision the possibility of
lowering input costs or creating foods with properties highly desired by consumers.  The
demonstrated possibility of producing pharmaceuticals through genetically engineered
plants and animals reinforces the interests of drug companies in agricultural
biotechnology.
A new life sciences industry is emerging from the combinations of chemical, agricultural
and pharmaceutical companies. Dealing with such masses of data and making sense of
them requires big computers and outstanding scientists.  It is estimated that the maize
genome contains about 30,000 genes and about 3 billion base pairs, “which makes it
comparable in size to the human genome.”24 C panies are becoming ever bigger to
secure as much of the talent and information as possible and are aggressively patenting
processes, traits, and sequences.  The US Patent and Trademark Office received 4000
patent requests for nucleic acid sequences in 1991 and 500,000 in 1996.25
Mergers and acquisitions across pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and agribusiness has created
a few mega-companies like Novartis, valued at over $100 billion.26  Monsanto began its
biotechnology work in 1981 before it bought its first seed company. Its biggest
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agricultural venture has been the creation of crops engineered to be resistant to its
Roundup herbicide.  Selling seeds of such crops through its subsidiary companies or
licensing the Roundup Ready gene has been the primary reason why herbicide resistant
crops are planted on nearly 20 million hectares of land in 1998.27 In 1997 Monsanto took
a major step in transforming itself into a DNA-based company by splitting into biotech
and chemical divisions and then selling off its chemical division.28  DuPont, another
traditional chemical company, in early 1998 split its life sciences work into one of three
business units and shortly thereafter announced plans to sell off its energy company in
order to invest the proceeds in life sciences.29  Hoechst sold its basic chemicals divisions
and invested in AgrEvo, an agribusiness biotechnology venture with Schering, bought
Plant Genetic Systems for $600 million, acquired Cargill’s North American seed business
for $650 million and recently announced a merger of their agricultural, pharmaceuticals
and veterinary medicine activities with Rhone-Poulenc.30
Dow was a chemical company until 1989 when it absorbed Eli Lilly as a wholly-owned
subsidiary and changed its name to DowElanco.  In December, 1996 the company
expanded its access to biotechnology when it became a majority shareholder in Mycogen,
a diversified biotechnology company with technology for insect-resistant crops.  In April,
1998 the company acquired a cotton seed breeding program located in the Chaco
province of Argentina and a Brazilian hybrid maize seed company.  In July, 1998
Mycogen and Rhône-Poulenc Agro, the crop protection subsidiary of Rhône-Poulenc SA,
signed a letter of intent to pool plant biotechnology assets to develop and market
genetically modified plants and seed products containing multiple traits, initially focusing
on modifying cotton and sugarcane with Mycogen's insect resistance gene derived from
the natural insecticide Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) and Rhône-Poulenc Agro's gene
sequences which provide tolerance to various herbicides.31
Research Investments in Public Sector Organizations.  At the same time as the life
sciences industry has been consolidating small seed companies into mega-seed
companies, they have been investing huge sums in research, not only in their own
laboratories but in new ventures with public sector organizations.  In July of 1998, a new
private-public consortium announced the creation of a $145 million basic plant research
center in St Louis.  With a staff of 80 and an annual budget of $15 million, the new center
will be run as a not-for-profit organization.  The sponsors include the Danforth
Foundation, Washington University, the Missouri Botanical Garden, the University of
Missouri, the Monsanto Fund and Monsanto itself.  The center will receive its own
patents and any income from licensing.  Monsanto will benefit through close association
with the center, but the center is intended to operate independently from its backers.32
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In July of 1998, Novartis announced the planned investment of $600 million to fund
initiatives in plant biology.  The first step was the creation of the Novartis Agricultural
Discovery Institute (NADI), to be located in San Diego, California with about 180
researchers.33  In November 1998 the University of California at Berkeley announced a
$25 million deal with NADI for the support of basic research in agricultural genetics in
return for first rights to negotiate for the findings.  The basics of the deal provide $5
million a year, two-thirds for direct support of projects selected on a competitive basis
and one-third for overhead and infrastructure costs to the University.   NADI may also
“supply proprietary tools, technology or tangible research materials under appropriate
confidentiality and/or material transfer agreements. As it becomes developed, a database
of NADI genomics bioinformation may also be made available to program participants
who choose to access a NADI facility (under a separate "access" agreement) where a
suite of workstations will be available.”  A six member Advisory Committee is
responsible for the relationship between the University and Novartis while a five member
Research Committee selects and oversees projects.34
There is little doubt that more deals like this between major public sector institutions and
the big private companies will be struck in the future.  Other initiatives will also be
generated, in part as reactions to such deals.  Recently, the Director of the Cornell
University Agricultural Experiment Station promulgated a “Statement of Intent to Form
the Consortium for Genomics Research in the Public Sector.”   The national public sector
plant research organizations of Brazil, China, India, and the United States, as well as five
of the CGIAR research centers (IRRI, ICARDA, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, CIAT) have
indicated their willingness to subscribe to the consortium,35 which seeks to serve the
world community through the development, application and dissemination of genomics
and computer technology relevant to world germplasm resources in plants.  Cornell
University has established an Institute for Genomic Diversity devoted to developing and
applying genomic technologies and computational tools to the conservation, evaluation
and utilization of plant genomic resources worldwide and intends to support the
consortium through information resources, knowledge, and training.
What are the Challenges?
The speed and economic muscle behind recent developments in private company plant
genetics are viewed with pride and hope by some and with apprehension by others.  The
mega-seed companies’ views are reflected in their aggressive corporate advertising
campaigns and high-tech home pages on the World Wide Web.36  F nancial market forces
have generated immense investment and shareholder value.  But the trends also raise a
number of concerns of  public interest.  With such power directed at applications, what
will happen to basic science and who will teach the next generation of plant biologists?
With market forces directing priorities, how will the needs of those without market power
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be met?  How will developing countries adjust to the rapidly changing plant germplasm
realities?  With such a great degree of market concentration, how will abuses of power be
avoided?
Basic Research and Education. Basic research is conducted with little or no thought of a
product other than increase of knowledge; it encourage researchers to simply learn as
much as they can about whatever they care to investigate.  Scientists employed by private
companies are sharply focused on products.  The more money companies pour into
research, the greater the proportion of work directed toward technology development and
the less toward basic research for knowledge building.  “But technological progress
cannot continue without the input of basic research and the conceptual breakthroughs it
makes possible…Apart from a handful of exceptions, the new technological companies in
the Silicon Valley mold do not invest in long-term research.”37   Basi  research has no
role in corporate research or in educational programs driven by sharply defined end-
products.
Considerably more knowledge is needed to achieve the promises of biotechnology. We
still know very little about how to make use of DNA sequence information.  The task of
matching data with function or with means of affecting the function is huge.  Even with
the full DNA sequence of an organism, “with regard to understanding how to make sense
of the A’s, T’s, G’s, and C’s of genomic sequence, by and large we are functional
illiterates…For now the genomic sequence of an organism is written in a language we
barely comprehend.  However, through the work of the scientific community, we can
attach biological meaning to limited regions of the sequence.”38  Scientists working
toward highly applied goals will not generate this kind of more basic knowledge.  It is
short sighted to believe that simply because the life sciences industry is making large
investments in plant biotechnology that the knowledge base for the next fundamental
breakthrough beyond DNA will be built.
A related problem will occur with educating the next generation of plant biologists.  If the
most talented scientists are employed in companies and not in universities, the quality of
education will suffer, graduating scientists will know more technology specifics but be
less able to build new knowledge.  Likewise, because training in biology so much a
hands-on matter, unless students can use the latest processes, tools and materials, which
may be restricted if produced in corporate labs, knowledge will be restrained.
In most cases owners of intellectual property permit its use for teaching and research, but
simply obtaining appropriate permissions takes time and resources, thereby slowing the
process.  Recognition of these concerns may be one of the factors motivating the funding
of university biology departments by Novartis and Monsanto.  The unrestricted nature of
the research conducted under Monsanto’s funding to the Danforth lab and of Novartis’
funding to Berkeley suggests this may be the case.  Of course, Novartis has members on
both the Advisory Committee and the Research Committee that are responsible for the
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38 William M. Gelbart, Databases in Genomic Research, Science v. 282, 23 October, 1998,p. 659-61.
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Berkeley grant, so skeptics may claim that enables sufficient direction by the company.
Still, the funding does provide some recognition of the value of undirected research.
Needs Poorly Expressed in the Market.  According to Evenson, “Clearly there is an
economic role for the public sector even when the private sector is actively inventing new
usable technology.  The standard public good argument applies to plant germplasm.” 39
While this is possibly an overstatement, as plant germplasm may not be a pure public
good, he identifies three elements in the case for public sector investment in crop
germplasm variety development:
1. Clear identification of the problems and limitations of existing technology in order
that germplasm can be tailored to overcome these problems may not be done
completely by market-driven mechanisms,
2. The need to provide technology for markets too small to interest the existing firms,
3. When public sector investment is needed to ensure technological competition.
Small markets exist for many minor crops in the United States where the opportunity for
profit is limited.  This may include crops that (1) are cultivated on a limited acreage, (2)
provide relatively limited gross revenue, (3) for which there is no existing plant breeding
base.  “A National Plan for Promoting Breeding Programs for Minor Crops in the U.S.
has been developed by a coalition of private and public plant breeders (the “Buckwheat
Coalition”).40
Two mitigating factors suggest some of these concerns may be overdrawn for
industrialized countries.  As the plant breeding activities of the big companies expand to
fully meet the needs for the major crops there seems no obvious reasons why they would
not turn to the minor crops.  Second, according to the theory of “synteny” there is great
similarity among genes and where they lie in relation to one another along the
chromosomes, at least within families of plants.  To the extent that this holds, research on
one plant will have great value in addressing the challenges in other plants.41  These
mitigating factors do not, however, offset major concerns of developing countries.
                                         
39 Evenson, R.E. Intellectual property Rights and Agribusiness Research and development: Implications for
the Public Agricultural Research System.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65 (5) December
1983.
40 W.R. Coffman, op. cite.
41 Gale, M.D. and K.M. Devos, Plant comparative genetics after 10 years, Science v. 282 23 October, 1997,
p. 656-8.
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Developing Countries Concerns.  Crop productivity is determined by genetics and
environment and by their interactions, so plant biotechnology addressing plant production
challenges of the industrialized North have limited relevance to the tropics.  If the genes
that control a plant’s reactions to elements of tropical production environments are not
identified, the gains from synteny will be limited.  Further, because over half the
investment in plant biotechnology is directed toward herbicide resistance or product
quality,42 which may not be the highest priority for developing countries, the potential for
spillover is limited.
Developing country crop variety development systems are poorly equipped to deal with
the rapid changes that are occurring because they have depended so extensively on
international free exchange of germplasm.  As plant research in the industrialized world
has come to be dominated by private companies this process has slowed.  But public-
sector plant breeders don’t know how to respond, and when they try are handicapped by
the huge disparity in resources and negotiating power between themselves and the
companies.
Among the most important assets accumulated by previous public investments are the
plant germplasm collections of developing countries and the CGIAR.  These logically
should form the basis for variety development efforts for those markets.  It i  now
possible for a company to take an existing variety, insert a few genes, take out a patent,
and try to sell the seeds wherever they are adapted.  Of course, the value of any variety is
determined by the combinations of genes that determine height, leaf density, drought
tolerance, disease resistance, grain type, maturation period, and so forth.  The addition of
one or two traits adds value, but clearly there was value in the preexisting line or variety.
Without IPR on that preexisting line any compensation to plant breeders or institutions
who developed the previous variety is unlikely.  All varieties are built on preexisting
varieties, and as recently as 50 to 100 years ago, all seeds were selections by farmers of
the most attractive plants in their fields.  These so-called landraces underlie all plant
breeding.
The argument is made that the public interest demands some compen ation by private
companies who add a few genes to existing varieties.  One possibility is market
segmentation to allow the poorest developing-country farmers to obtain improved
varieties at minimum cost while imposing higher charges to others.  To ensure this is at
least a possibility, public-sector plant breeding organizations must gain the capability to
deal with IPRs and negotiate with private companies to preserve the public interest in
assets accumulated with public funding.
Company Power and Freedom to Operate.  The ownership of a large fraction of seed
production capacity by a few firms is beginning to attract public attention.  One only need
recall how domination of the American automobile industry by the Big Three allowed
them to set prices and determine product characteristics.  Only when foreign firms
introduced new ideas was price and quality competition regained.  The current court case
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against Microsoft is providing many claims about the anticompetitive nature of a highly
concentrated market.
Given the existing intellectual property rights on the tools, processes, materials, and
cloned genes that are inherent components of plant biotechnology, a company has rights
to products made using those components.  However, there are disputes about how far
rights should “reach through” to subsequent discoveries.  For example, Cre-loxP is a tool
used to create research animals to study the function of certain genes.  A gene has been
identified that appears to play a role in a particular disease.  Further research has
identified a molecule that serves as a drug target.  Drug development and screening is
pursued without use of the Cre-loxP.  Can the drug developer enter into licenses for the
drug’s production and sale without involving the company that owns the IPR on Cre-
loxP, the original tool?
Some commentators claim the company is leveraging “its proprietary position in
upstream research tools into a broad veto right over downstream research and product
development,” while representatives of the company that owns the tool claim they
“reserve neither right in our license agreements with academic and other not-for-profit
institutions.”43  Subsequently representatives of another academic institution report
having approached the holders of IPR on proprietary research tools such as promoters
and transformation systems for discussions on commercializing applications of the
technology in crop plants.  They report with “surprise and dismay” that “the holders of
these proprietary “upstream” technologies “have effective veto power over whom
universities can and cannot approach with their technologies for commercial
development.”44
Examples of power plays by companies are making the rounds of the academic plant
biology community, and they extend to the developing world.  A developing country
research institution working with a CGIAR research center using public support seeks
agreement to use a proprietary gene in the development of technology to address a major
problem confronting smallholder farmers in Africa.  The company holding the IPR agrees
to license the gene only if it and it alone can determine how commercialization will
proceed in the event the research proves successful.45  Many researchers are discovering
that it is easy to get a material transfer agreement or other license to use proprietary
technology for research purposes, but when the research turns up a potentially useful
technology, some owners of IPR don’t hesitate to use their power to dictate how and even
whether commercialization can proceed.  The freedom to conduct research is different
from the right to negotiate with the owner of IPR when it comes time to apply research
results in farmers fields.
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Where does the public interest lie?
In a time of rapid change, it is not easy to see where the public interest lies.  Most might
agree it is in the public interest to promote those social desirable objectives that may be
neglected without deliberate action and to discourage or prohibit socially undesirable
results that might occur if deliberate public action is not taken, or that intellectual
property “rights should be shared so that the maximum benefit eventually accrues to the
maximum number of people.”46  But these idealistic concepts provide little concrete
policy guidance.
The discovery of DNA and the invention of techniques using DNA have made the
previously invisible global genetic commons visible.  The interaction of technological
change and intellectual property rights is allowing the transformation of DNA from a
public good whose consumption was non-rival and non-excludable (and perhaps not even
recognized) into private property.  If one believes that such claims on the global genetic
commons are necessary in order to make the “fruits of nature” usable, one may view
these developments positively.    On the other hand, the privatization of the genetic
commons might simply redound to the benefit of some particular persons at the expense
of the larger society.
Despite the great wealth creating power of market forces, it is clear they do not resolve
all issues in a socially desirable way.  Collective social action is needed to set the
institutional framework within which market forces operate, and the institutional
solutions may differ for industrialized and developing countries.    Increasingly, as cross-
national flows of capital, information, goods, and people have reaches massive
proportions, national institutional frameworks are becoming inadequate.  Multinational
companies can shift operations and funds across national boundaries with ease and
impunity, and as a consequence, there is a need to examine plant biotechnology issues not
only from national viewpoints, but also from an international perspective.
Market power:  Markets in which there is a single seller (monopoly) or several sellers
(oligopoly) tend to operate in ways that follow from their structure.  In order to maximize
their profits, sellers in such markets have the incentive to increase prices and reduce
quantities relative to prices and quantities that would occur in a competitive market.  The
concentration of seed production in the hands of a few companies will inevitably lead in
those directions.  The classical cases of “natural monopoly” that have existed in earlier
eras, for example, with public utilities led some countries to establish nationalized
monopolies or alternatively to establish regulatory bodies that set prices charged to
consumers.47  Alternative public responses have been dissolution of monopolies.
Consolidation of seed producers has reached such an extent that representatives of
farmers in the United States are becoming alarmed and are beginning to call for some
such remedies.
                                         
46 See the editorial in New Scientist, 17 April 1999 on information and property rights.
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Many developing countries are at a significant disadvantage in controlling monopolies,
having relatively few persons with the knowledge required to regulate monopolies,
especially in a relatively esoteric field like plant biotechnology.  Many countries have
historically provided for a controlled monopoly or a government monopoly in crop
research and seed production.  The experience has been mixed, however, and in recent
years the World Bank has urged borrowing countries to divest themselves of operating
companies like those that produce and sell seeds.  Typically, such companies are
purchased by one of the big multinationals, but the monopoly position is preserved.  A
more preferable policy would be to allow local production or importation and sales of
seeds by any company, subject only to quality standards.  In addition, the large
multinational seed companies are actively negotiating with developing countries for
rights to import and sell their products under special arrangements, which amount to
government-blessed monopolies.  All monopoly and oligopoly situations should be
resisted because competitive markets in seed development, production and sales will
generate the greatest public benefit.
Patents and plant variety protection.  Pate ts are a special case of monopoly, one
endorsed by society for a limited time period and requiring disclosure of the invention.
Many argue that patents function to stimulate economic activity by granting exclusive
rights to the inventor to economically exploit the invention.  However, others argue that
for small developing countries, patents raise the costs of new goods and restrict the
ability of local, low-capital innovators to improve on existing technology, especially in
the plant area.
A key question with implications for building knowledge in plant biotechnology is what
shall be patented.  The United States Patent Office allows the patenting of SNPs – single
nucleotide polymorphisms or single base pair polymorphisms in the DNA of organisms.
Companies specializing in the identification of SNPs and other molecular markers
anticipate selling that information to others who would commercialize the application of
the knowledge.  SNPs are, however, essentially existing constructs of nature,  discovered
but not invented, and it is reasonable to ask where the line should be drawn between
public and private ownership of the genome.  This is an issue requiring further public
debate and, when resolved, perhaps further legislation.
The United States is the only major country to allow the use of patents to protect  crop
varieties, and U.S.-based companies have pressured the United States government to
urge, in international negotiations,  that patents be the system of choice for all countries.
Ironically, the patenting of varieties is currently being challenged in a case before the
United States District Court.48   There is a chance that in the U.S. patenting of varieties
will be disallowed because there exists legislation providing an alternative system of
protecting the intellectual property embodied in plant varieties.  If  the practice of
patenting varieties is overturned, intellectual property in crop varieties in the United
States would be governed by the plant variety protection (PVP) system, which is similar
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to protection provided in many other countries and is internationally recognized under the
UPOV treaty.
The plant variety protection system allows farmers to save seed for their own reuse and
plant breeders to use them in research designed to produce further varietal improvement.
Both these provisions are prohibited by patents but seen to have significant public
welfare advantages, certainly for developing country agriculture.  Regardless of what
happens in the United States, the use of the PVP system, which prevails in most of
Europe, is preferable for developing countries.  With little competitive loss, the big seed
companies could agree to use PVP in developing countries in cooperation with public
breeding agencies.
Biotechnology and IPR capacity in developing countries:  The capacity of governments
or the science sectors of many developing countries to understand, deploy and negotiate
regarding biotechnology is quite limited.  They simply have very few people with the
education and experience required to understand these matters.  Training to build national
capacity in the science and management of biotechnology, intellectual property rights,
biosafety, and international negotiations is an overwhelming need.  This will require
considerable investment by individuals, countries and donors.  Life science companies
have contributed to building the needed capacity through projects that link specific
technologies with training of scientists, such as with the sweet potato in East Africa or
potato in Mexico.  But these arrangements have involved fewer than 10 scientists.  What
is needed is a massive effort to create a cadre of national scientists so countries
themselves can make determinations about what standards are appropriate and what
technology to use.
Companies could establish a fellowship program for training developing country
scientists in crop biotechnology, intellectual property and international negotiations.
Participating companies could contribute to a fellowship fund administered by a neutral
fellowship agency, something like the Fullbright program.  Fellows would be chosen on a
competitive basis according to criteria that might include national agricultural needs and
academic excellence.  Training 500 individuals to the PhD level would require about $75
million.  If the fund and the award process is insulated from the companies, fellows
would be seen as national resources and would not be obligated to the commercial
interests.
Biotechnology tools and techniques.  To speed the development of biotechnology
capacity in developing countries, companies that have intellectual property rights over
certain techniques or materials might agree to license these for use in developing
countries at no cost.  The agrobactrium transformation system is one possible candidate
for such treatment.  Another candidate might be all the privately held genomic data about
a key crop species in which much genomic data is already in the public domain, say rice.
Making these key tools available, not just for research, but for commercial applications in
developing countries might give a boost to developing country scientists.
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Another set of actions would relieve apprehension in the developing world over what
they perceive as unreasonable intellectual property rights claims on crop varieties or crop
traits of distinct national origin such as South Asian basmati rice or Thailand’s Jasmine
rice.  The U.S. patent on “Basmati rice lines and grains” specifically claims the invention
of “novel rice lines with plants that are semi-dwarf in stature, substantially photoperiod
insensitive and high yielding, and that produce rice grains having characteristics similar
or superior to those of good quality basmati rice grains produced in India and Pakistan.”49
An agreement to share financial rewards from such inventions or grant free licenses to
use such lines in breeding programs in the country of origin of the said trait might gain
the appreciation of developing country researchers.  One might also foresee the
possibility of legal actions in the United States and Europe against companies that claim
IPR on such traditional crop traits.
Gene protection systems.  Efforts to induce farmers to purchase all the seeds they need
are probably not socially optimal in developing countries because seed production
systems are not adequate to supplying all the needed seeds and farmers have limited cash
liquidity for such purchases.  This can be seen from the experience with hybrids.  They
provide a certain natural inducement to purchase new seeds each year but in many
developing countries farmers choose not to do so but instead to accept the lower yield
associated with reusing the grain from hybrid maize as seed.  The idea of using in
developing countries technologies designed to prevent germination of grain as seed,
thereby blocking farmers from saving their own seed (called “terminator” by some), has
engendered strong opposition in most quarters.  The possible consequences if farmers
who are unaware of the characteristics of such seed purchase it and attempt to reuse it are
certainly negative and may outweigh any social benefits of the seeds thereby protected.
In any case, there is widespread negative public reaction to encouraging poor farmers to
use such technology.
An alternative approach to protecting genetic technology might be to develop a “lock and
key” gene control system based on the idea that genes would be freely available for
incorporation by any breeder, but would be silent until they are turned on by farmers
through a deliberate process, say the application of an environmentally friendly, bio-
degradable “key” compound.  All the “base” traits in such seeds would be reproduced
when it was saved and replanted unlike with the terminator gene, but only when the key
compound is applied would the additional, special traits be expressed.
Food and environmental safety.  Over the past six months an intense controversy has
erupted in Europe, especially in England, about genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
in foods that threatens the entire agricultural biotechnology process.  One focus of
challenge is the safety of GMOs as food. A second challenge is the possible negative
environmental effects of the introduction of GMOs into the crop production environment.
These issues have been the subject of much scrutiny during the development of
genetically engineered crops and are a number of procedures have been put in place by
national authorities to ensure safety.  Another objection is the moral, ethical issue of
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meddling with nature or “playing God.”  These issues are being contested, but many
believe they could be resolved if genetically engineered foods were labeled.
If instead, policies are implemented in Europe that impose such strict constraints on
GMOs as to stop or significantly slow the deployment of GMOs in developing countries,
either through regulations or because of spillover of opinion, it could have significant
negative consequences on using biotechnology in developing countries and hence on
future food supply.  Already many countries lag behind with implementing procedures
under which such GMOs could be tested and approved for production.  Meanwhile, in
1998, over 60 million acres of GMO corn and soybeans were grown, mainly in the
United States and Canada.
Need for a public dialogue.  It is clear that the wide range of suggestions made here will
not simply be accepted by companies or governments.  In many cases there is no clearly
preferable position.  In some cases agreement by a single company would disadvantage
that company.  What is needed is a wide-ranging, broadly inclusive dialogue among all
concerned parties -- civil society, governments, companies, scientists, ethicists, and
intergovernmental agencies to consider these issues and agree on a framework for their
resolution in the future.  It is certain they will continue to become ever more complex.
PROS AND CONS OF IPR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Pros
· Provides incentives to create knowledge
· Encourages greater research and development within the country
· Discloses information other researchers can use to make further advances
· Encourages greater research and development investments in industrialized countries on issues of
concern in developing countries
· Encourages transfer of knowledge to developing countries
· Creates a market for knowledge by providing a legal basis for technology sales and licensing
Cons
· Increases costs of protected products and may price them beyond the reach of the poor
· Shifts bargaining power toward producers of knowledge rather than users
· Broad patents may discourage follow-on inventions and slow the overall pace of innovation
· The knowledge gap between industrial and developing countries may increase
· Industrial-country firms may take advantage of indigenous knowledge and natural products without
compensation to lcal communities
